Introduction

Political Poll Experiment By:
Clifford Brown
Wittenberg University
Springfield, Ohio
cbrown@wittenberg.edu

Back to Instructor's Page

Introduction
Method
Data Analysis
References

Introduction

As intuitive psychologists, people are typically rational and logical processors of social information, but they also have shortcomings: sources of oversight, error, or bias that affect their ability to understand and interact with others (Ross, 1977). One such bias, the false consensus bias, demonstrates that social observers estimate their own attitudes, opinions, and behavioral tendencies as relatively common across a variety of personal, social, and political issues including drug use, abortion, and presidential politics (Brown, 1982,1996; Brown & Shuman, 1994; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985; Suls, Wan, & Sanderson, 1988). The Political Poll experiment examines the false consensus bias and perceptions of gender differences in participants’ estimates of presidential preferences in the 2000 election.
« Return to Top»

Method

Participants in this study are asked to indicate their own preference among the four major presidential candidates in the 2000 election (Pat Buchanan, George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader). They are then asked to estimate the percentage of others who prefer each candidate, where the total percentage must equal to 100%. Participants make these estimates for four groups of others: (1) Others of the same age and same sex, (2) Others of the same age and opposite sex, (3) Eligible voters of the same sex, and (4) Eligible voters of the opposite sex.
« Return to Top»

Data Analysis and Anticipated Results

Estimates of support for each candidate will be examined as a function of the participants’ presidential preference. Those participants who prefer George W. Bush, for example, are expected to have higher estimates of others supporting Bush, as compared to the estimates of support for Bush made by participants who prefer the other three candidates. Similarly, those participants who prefer Al Gore are expected to have higher estimates of others supporting Gore, as compared to the estimates of support for Gore made by participants who prefer the other three candidates. If findings such as these occur, then the false consensus bias will have been demonstrated.

It is also expected that the size of the false consensus bias will depend, in part, on the group of others for whom the estimates are made. Typically, the more similar others are to the participant, the greater the tendency to have the false consensus bias. That is, the false consensus bias is expected to be greatest when estimating the preferences of others of the same age and same sex as the participant, and smallest when estimating the preferences of eligible voters of the opposite sex as the participant.

In addition, the data will be examined for actual and presumed gender differences. For example, Mutter and Brown (1997) examined estimated support for Clinton and Dole in the 1996 presidential election and found that both women and men presumed that female students would be more like to prefer Clinton than male students. In actuality, however, 68% of the women and 70% of the men in the study preferred Clinton versus Dole. Students in this study were probably influenced by media reports of a “gender gap” in which women, as compared to men, nation-wide more strongly supported Clinton over Dole. The current study of presidential preferences in the 2000 election will look for similar findings.
« Return to Top»

References

Brown, C. E. (1982). A false consensus bias in 1980 presidential preferences. The Journal of Social Psychology, 118, 137‑138.

Brown, C. E. (1996). False consensus bias and gender: The case of judge Clarence Thomas. Psychological Reports, 78, 144‑146.

Brown, C. E., & Shuman, V. (1994). False consensus bias and gender: Presidential preferences and the right to chose. Psychological Reports, 78, 144-146.

Mutter, J. C., & Brown, C. E. (1997). Presidential preferences in the 1996 election: False consensus and presumed gender differences. Paper presented at the sixty-ninth annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.

Nisbett, R. E., & Kunda, Z. (1985). Perception of social distributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 297‑311.

Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press.

Suls, J., Wan, C. K., & Sanders, G. S. (1988). False consensus and false uniqueness in estimating the prevalence in health‑protective behaviors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18, 66‑79.
« Return to Top»

Last revised:June 03, 2003 11:46:57 AM
Copyright© 1995 The University of Mississippi. All rights reserved.
Questions about this page?PsychExps



Political Poll Experiment	By: Clifford Brown Wittenberg University Springfield, Ohio cbrown@wittenberg.edu

Back to Instructor's Page
Introduction Method Data Analysis References
Introduction
As intuitive psychologists, people are typically rational and logical processors of social information, but they also have shortcomings: sources of oversight, error, or bias that affect their ability to understand and interact with others (Ross, 1977). One such bias, the false consensus bias, demonstrates that social observers estimate their own attitudes, opinions, and behavioral tendencies as relatively common across a variety of personal, social, and political issues including drug use, abortion, and presidential politics (Brown, 1982,1996; Brown & Shuman, 1994; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985; Suls, Wan, & Sanderson, 1988). The Political Poll experiment examines the false consensus bias and perceptions of gender differences in participants’ estimates of presidential preferences in the 2000 election. « Return to Top»
Method
Participants in this study are asked to indicate their own preference among the four major presidential candidates in the 2000 election (Pat Buchanan, George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader). They are then asked to estimate the percentage of others who prefer each candidate, where the total percentage must equal to 100%. Participants make these estimates for four groups of others: (1) Others of the same age and same sex, (2) Others of the same age and opposite sex, (3) Eligible voters of the same sex, and (4) Eligible voters of the opposite sex. « Return to Top»
Data Analysis and Anticipated Results
Estimates of support for each candidate will be examined as a function of the participants’ presidential preference. Those participants who prefer George W. Bush, for example, are expected to have higher estimates of others supporting Bush, as compared to the estimates of support for Bush made by participants who prefer the other three candidates. Similarly, those participants who prefer Al Gore are expected to have higher estimates of others supporting Gore, as compared to the estimates of support for Gore made by participants who prefer the other three candidates. If findings such as these occur, then the false consensus bias will have been demonstrated. It is also expected that the size of the false consensus bias will depend, in part, on the group of others for whom the estimates are made. Typically, the more similar others are to the participant, the greater the tendency to have the false consensus bias. That is, the false consensus bias is expected to be greatest when estimating the preferences of others of the same age and same sex as the participant, and smallest when estimating the preferences of eligible voters of the opposite sex as the participant. In addition, the data will be examined for actual and presumed gender differences. For example, Mutter and Brown (1997) examined estimated support for Clinton and Dole in the 1996 presidential election and found that both women and men presumed that female students would be more like to prefer Clinton than male students. In actuality, however, 68% of the women and 70% of the men in the study preferred Clinton versus Dole. Students in this study were probably influenced by media reports of a “gender gap” in which women, as compared to men, nation-wide more strongly supported Clinton over Dole. The current study of presidential preferences in the 2000 election will look for similar findings. « Return to Top»
References
Brown, C. E. (1982). A false consensus bias in 1980 presidential preferences. The Journal of Social Psychology, 118, 137‑138. Brown, C. E. (1996). False consensus bias and gender: The case of judge Clarence Thomas. Psychological Reports, 78, 144‑146. Brown, C. E., & Shuman, V. (1994). False consensus bias and gender: Presidential preferences and the right to chose. Psychological Reports, 78, 144-146. Mutter, J. C., & Brown, C. E. (1997). Presidential preferences in the 1996 election: False consensus and presumed gender differences. Paper presented at the sixty-ninth annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL. Nisbett, R. E., & Kunda, Z. (1985). Perception of social distributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 297‑311. Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press. Suls, J., Wan, C. K., & Sanders, G. S. (1988). False consensus and false uniqueness in estimating the prevalence in health‑protective behaviors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18, 66‑79. « Return to Top»

Last revised:June 03, 2003 11:46:57 AM Copyright© 1995 The University of Mississippi. All rights reserved. Questions about this page?PsychExps